

August 1978

Some 200 Russian agents are working under United Nations cover to destroy our country. The United States pays 25 percent of their salaries.

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# KGB IN NEW YORK: THE UNITED NATIONS SOVIET SPY BASE

BY JOE TRENTO AND DAVE ROMAN

**T**he Soviet Union's international secret police—the KGB—is operating at an unprecedented pace and scale in the United States today. A six-month-long investigation by this magazine reveals that the KGB—the largest, best-trained, and best-paid intelligence service in the world, consisting of approximately 500,000 employees—is now basing all American operations out of the United Nations complex in New York.

More than 200 Russian KGB agents work under U.N. "cover" as employees at all levels of the U.N. Secretariat, which handles all administration and programs for the world body. These agents act in obvious contravention of their U.N. oath not "to accept instructions . . . from any government or other authority."

Furthermore, American citizens, who pay some \$118 million each year to the United Nations, are literally financing 25 percent of the KGB agents' salaries.

*Penthouse* also learned:

- There is no efficient security check conducted to make certain that U.N. employees are not affiliated with foreign intelligence services or that they do not have other questionable backgrounds.

- Because the most knowledgeable and expert CIA counterintelligence officers were forced out of the agency in 1975, the KGB and other foreign intelligence agencies now have a free rein within the United States.

- A large percentage of the KGB force operating from the United Nations are known officers in Department V—the KGB elite specializing in murder, terrorism, and sabotage.

During its investigation *Penthouse* interviewed former top CIA and FBI counterintel-

ligence officials and several Soviet agents and reviewed U.N. personnel files. It learned that KGB agents are currently concentrating their major efforts on the following vital areas:

- The CIA computer system at Langley;
- The Nevada Nuclear Test Site, where highly accurate MIRV warheads are tested;
- The recruitment of fired CIA officials, embittered over their treatment by CIA director Stansfield Turner;
- The Trident Nuclear Submarine Program.

"The KGB is made up of top professionals, who are dedicated and well rewarded for their efforts," James Jesus Angleton, the former head of CIA counterintelligence, told *Penthouse*. Angleton confirms the U.N. activities by the KGB and says, "Diplomatic access and immunity make the United Nations a spy nest." He told *Penthouse* that the "key" figure in all of the Soviet Union's U.N. activities is Vassili V. Vakhrushev.

At fifty-five the urbane Vakhrushev is at the height of his profession as both a U.N. and a KGB administrator.

Since 1975 he has been acting director of the United Nations Information Center in Moscow. But one set of duties that is not in his U.N. pledge is the one that he conducts for the KGB. According to FBI officials, Vakhrushev is running the KGB operation in the United States.

Angleton has a high regard for Vakhrushev's abilities as an agent and a KGB officer: "He is a top man. He gets the best of everything because he has proven himself to the KGB, and their system of rewards and promotions is much less bureaucratic than our own."

Vakhrushev's post has traditionally been held by a KGB official. But in 1975, when

Vakhrushev was approved as the new "acting director," the appointment was made with the understanding that he would supervise the KGB's U.S. operation from the safety of Moscow. When he needs to come to the United States, his diplomatic immunity allows him to do so as often as necessary.

His hiring at the United Nations was orchestrated with the smoothness that one would expect from an international organization. Two high U.N. officials, W.H. Tarzi of Afghanistan and A.S. Efimov of the Soviet Union, arranged for the contract. Soviet aid to Afghanistan was one lever the KGB pushed to get their man approved.

In addition, the Soviets are allowed to call Vakhrushev "acting director" no matter how long he holds his post. This provision allows the KGB to move him to another post without any U.N. investigation.

As one U.N. spokesman put it, "It is a political thing. We have fifty of these U.N. information offices, and the Soviets enjoy this title business by themselves."

One of Vakhrushev's predecessors in the U.N. job had been Mikhail Mikhailovich Antipov—a Department V officer who had saturated the United Nations with KGB operations during the 1960s.

Vakhrushev's secret employment file, which was examined by *Penthouse*, reveals that not even a cursory investigation into his background was made. He first caught the eye of Soviet intelligence officials during his wartime career in the Red Army. In postwar Russia he was lifted out of obscurity and sent to the International Relations School at Moscow University. The KGB sponsored his education. His on-the-job training was begun in the Foreign Ministry in Moscow in 1948. His knowledge of

other cultures shone and Vakhushchev was assigned to the KGB's disinformation branch at the Foreign Language Publishing House in Moscow.

Listed on his 1975 U.N. application is one V.N. Pavlov. This reference would be more suitable if one were looking for a job as a political hit man. Pavlov is today an administrative officer in Department V. He was tossed out of Canada during Expo 67 for his operation of a terrorist unit there. Vakhrushev had worked under him in Canada.

Another famous reference on Vakhushchev's application is Yakov A. Malik, former Soviet representative to the U.N. Malik had been deputy director of all clandestine services abroad for the KGB during the transition period after Stalin died.

Also listed as a character and job reference is one of the few KGB agents with full ambassadorial rank—S.A. Vinogradov, who oversaw KGB operations from his diplomatic post in Egypt during Nasser's romance with the Soviets.

(According to CIA sources, these operations included the murder of U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in the Congo in 1961. These sources indicate that the Russians murdered Hammarskjöld because of his opposition to their scheme to install a "troika"—a three-man tribunal—to run the United Nations. A secret report prepared by the CIA for President Kennedy in 1962 stated: "There is evidence collected by our technical field operatives that the explosive device aboard the aircraft was of standard KGB incendiary design." The CIA sources say that Kennedy kept this information secret because its publication would have destroyed any chance for agreement on a nuclear test-ban treaty with the Russians in 1963. The United Nations rejected the "troika" proposal after an emotional appeal by Kennedy in 1961; he asked the nations of the world to honor Hammarskjöld's memory by turning down the Russian scheme.)

The rest of Vakhushchev's background is, according to Angleton, typical of a KGB official. The KGB put him through advanced training in history and in communications. He became fluent in English, French, and Spanish for his assignments.

But it was his ability to get along with Westerners that brought him to the attention of the KGB's top brass on Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow. In 1959 Vakhushchev was assigned to be the interpreter for Averell Harriman on the latter's trip to Russia in connection with the blossoming cultural-exchange program with the United States. In a book that Governor Harriman wrote, he thanked Vakhushchev for his company on the trip. According to one former Angleton staff member, who asked not to have his name used, "This caused Vakhushchev's stock to soar. He made a real breakthrough with winning Harriman's confidence. From then on he had a role in selecting false Soviet defectors to feed disinformation to the CIA. Vakhushchev was considered to be an expert on the American mentality."

Before his hunting accident death last fall, former FBI Security Director William Sullivan told *Penthouse* that "Vakhushchev is a refinement of the Soviet intelligence process. Installing him was a stroke of genius, since he could use the U.N. sanctity to send U.S. military and political secrets through the U.N. diplomatic pouch."

Among the papers that *Penthouse* obtained concerning Vakhushchev is a special order naming him "diplomatic pouch certifying officer." According to CIA counterintelligence officials, this position allows Vakhushchev to send secret transmissions safely back and forth.

Vakhushchev's position with the United Nations involves running the U.N. information center in Moscow, one of fifty such centers around the world. His duties include promoting U.N. activities within the Soviet bloc, recruiting Soviet-bloc citizens for U.N. jobs, and handling all secret U.N. correspondence within the Soviet bloc. This job allows him access to U.N. confer-

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9

ences and permits him to travel freely on a U.N. passport to the United States.

Vakhushchev's real duties—those with the KGB—involve not only running U.S. operations for the KGB but also overseeing the entire Western Hemisphere, with special emphasis on Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. Day-to-day KGB communications from the United States are sent through the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. When major decisions have to be made, reports are sent to Vakhushchev via the diplomatic pouch. (According to *Penthouse* sources, Arkady Shevchenko, the Soviet U.N. official who defected to the U.S. in April, was not part of Vakhushchev's KGB operation in the United Nations.)

The CIA's central computer system is perhaps the KGB's most important American target. The implications of the system's being breached are enormous. Angleton is certain that a breach has occurred. In 1972 a CIA counterintelligence memo warned the CIA itself that "the lack of an in-house repair capability and the problem of breaching the computer system through electronics signal devices from the outside present a dire security question. As of now, the system cannot be protected, and no

technology exists to guarantee the integrity of the system, and none will exist in the foreseeable future."

Speaking to *Penthouse* recently, Angleton said that his worst fears had been proved right. "Everything in the CIA archives is now in the CIA computer, and over the last five years the computer has been breached from the outside. The threat to the national security from that computer is a tremendous one." Angleton's staff discovered that an employee for a large computer company that serviced the CIA computer had been recruited by the KGB. He explained how the Russians worked: "We engaged in game theory. We played with programming the computer—as we got information, we fed it into the computer and we learned how the CIA operated."

Another area Vakhushchev concentrated on was the U.S. weapons program, specifically the MIRV program and neutron bomb project being tested at the Nevada nuclear test site.

*Penthouse* learned that the KGB had agents posing as newsmen on the site and in active test tunnels as recently as six months ago. The Russians also have agents working for a construction company at the site. These agents, who were cleared by the American government, were working in test preparation.

Perhaps the most frightening aspect of the KGB's U.N. operation is one of the United States' own making. The CIA, under the orders of Adm. Stansfield Turner, its director, has ordered almost a thousand veteran CIA clandestine-services personnel fired. Many of those being fired are just short of retirement. Many are considered to be brilliant. Politically, the group is slowly banding together. James Angleton's Security and Intelligence Fund, which was formed last year, has been a rallying point for many of the fired operatives.

*Penthouse* spoke to a man who had directed much of the cooperative effort with multinationals in Latin America. He told a bizarre story of KGB recruitment.

"They came to me through a CIA guy who was axed last summer, after eighteen years with the agency. He was a photo interpreter. He told me that all I had to do was to describe the energy-monitoring program of the agency and I would find myself with \$30,000 in my bank account.

"I asked who wanted to know, and he told me it was information for a U.N. official. I asked him why he had sold out; he said he needed the money. They had cut him off without a nickel of retirement, and he had an invalid child at home. I couldn't turn him in," the former CIA official told *Penthouse*.

"The danger of some of these people being recruited is real. The agency has left some of them emotionally raw. The overwhelming amount are pros, they will survive, and they are patriotic, but the agency will never be the same," Angleton said.

Angleton's own personal experience gives his words a bitter veracity—he himself was a victim of one of Henry Kissinger's most devious schemes.

Angleton had long been a thorn in Kissinger's side. Although the counterintelligence expert continually expressed concern that Kissinger refused CIA briefings on how to avoid trap questions by Soviet officials, Kissinger continued to meet alone in Washington with high Russian officials. In such meetings it is standard CIA practice to brief the diplomat to make certain that a pattern of questioning is not developing that would lead the diplomat to reveal U.S. secrets. Angleton said he was worried that Kissinger might be inadvertently giving the Russians valuable information about the U.S. nuclear strategy.

After CIA Director Richard Helms was replaced by William Colby, the buffer between Kissinger and Angleton was gone. As Angleton explains it, "Politicians were running the CIA with Colby and his people."

Kissinger asked Colby to do anything he could to force Angleton and his entire staff to resign. In 1974 Colby provided Kissinger with information about an illegal mail-surveillance program that Angleton technically supervised. In point of fact, the program was a counterintelligence tool.

Through Colby, Kissinger released the story to the press. Then Angleton and his staff were summoned to Colby's office. According to Angleton, Colby said that because the story was out, the counterintelligence team would have to resign for the good of the agency. They all did.

"With that intensely political act, the counterintelligence shop we had built for thirty years was destroyed," Angleton says.

Angleton is not alone in feeling that, with the destruction of an effective U.S. counterintelligence, the Soviets have been given carte blanche. (In fact, there has been much speculation recently that the American intelligence community has been infiltrated by a Russian agent—or "mole"—at the highest levels.) One FBI inspector told *Penthouse* that counterintelligence at the FBI has become "a routine of tailing diplomats and electronic surveillance. But when it is done through the diplomatic service, you need a CIA operation to control this kind of activity. It just isn't working very well anymore. We once had hundreds of agents assigned to covering the KGB. But, hell, the mounties in Canada do a better job now."

What angers Angleton most about the U.N. operation is the irony of the United States' funding 25 percent of the salaries of all 374 Soviet citizens working in New York. The United States pays the highest assessment for the U.N.—some \$118 million for 1978. Angleton estimates that between 40 and 65 percent of the employees that the Russians have at the United Nations are KGB operatives. As a professional, Angleton admires the U.N. operation. "How could you do any better? You travel in the highest social and economic circles. It is a perfect place to recruit, to blackmail, and to gain access to information."

It's simple for KGB officials to be hired by the United Nations. The United Nations takes potential employees at their word. According to U.N. spokesman William P. Powell, "We have working here a group of international civil servants who have sworn to uphold an oath. We take them at their word. We require no security clearances."

Powell dismissed reports of previously expelled U.N. officials as KGB agents as "just newspaper stories" and confirmed that Vakhrushev's contract does not expire until 1979.

One area that does concern Department of Justice officials is the blatant operation of Department V teams in the United States. "We know the Soviets have trained saboteurs working in teams in California and the Midwest," one FBI official said. "But if we try to do something about it, people will call us paranoid."

"The FBI is paralyzed," Angleton says angrily.

According to one member of Angleton's former team, working as a congressional adviser, "It is not just the United States the KGB people target on. They go for their own defectors. They seek out and blackmail and kill defectors. Recruiting back a defector is valuable for them, and they can do that rather easily if the defector has a family in Russia."

Some of the methods used by the KGB are very heavy-handed. Indiscreet congressmen have been blackmailed by the KGB. "The use of sex is very popular as a tool by the KGB," says the congressional aide. *Penthouse* learned, for example, that the KGB tried and failed to blackmail former Illinois Congressman Kenneth J. Gray. The KGB threatened to reveal Gray's relationship with Elizabeth Ray, who worked for him in 1972 and who was later to accuse Gray and other congressmen of sexual misbehavior. Gray rejected the KGB threat and announced his retirement from Congress in 1973.

Another method of gaining information is through unsuspecting American journalists. According to Angleton: "They are always looking for a story," and "sometimes a KGB agent, posing as a news source, will feed a reporter a story. I know it happened, because the CIA used to make certain the KGB had phony stories, too." Once the reporter gains confidence in the source, information goes back and forth between them. Vakhrushev's résumé, not so incidentally, reveals that he is a member of the Soviet journalists' union.

At the bottom of the dozens of pages of Vakhrushev's U.N. file is the oath he signed when he accepted his position: "I solemnly swear . . . to exercise in all loyalty, discretion, and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my conduct with the interest of the United Nations only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions from any government or other authority external to the organization." O—B

7 July 1978

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